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DECENTRALIZATION 
Damien Kingsbury 
In a country as linguistically complex, historically geographically divided, in 
which services are best delivered locally, and in which there have, more recently, 
been real tensions over linguistic and geographic origins, the idea of devolving key 
state functions to the local level has always made sense. It is also a requirement of 
Timor-Leste's constitution. However, the process of developing a clear idea of what 
such decentralization should look like, how it could work, and when and how to 
implement it has been far from straightforward. Importantly, too, while Dili is the 
source of political authority and government expenditure and is the site of most 
development, more than 80 percent of Timor-Leste's population live elsewhere, 
mostly in rural village settings. For Timor-Leste to function as a coherent state, it 
requires a mechanism to bring the state and its services to the people. 
Although it is a tiny country, Timor-Leste's mountain ranges have historically 
divided its people. Situated between Southeast Asia, Melanesia, and Australia, its 
people have migrated from neighboring areas, bringing with them their languages 
and customs, the latter of which have over time found increasing commonality 
across the island. The traditional stories and rituals of Timor-Leste are remarkably 
similar, indicating a relatively high degree of nonlinguistic cultural fusion. Its 
languages, however, reflect the two principle sources of migration: Papua and 
Southeast Asia. These two chief language phyla are further divided into distinct 
languages and then subdivided on the basis of dialect, forming a complex linguistic 
patchwork of eighteen languages and sixteen distinct dialects. The preponderance of 
Papuan languages tends to be toward the east of the country, with Austronesian 
languages tending to be more located in the west, although there is a high level of 
mixing of these language groups across much of the country. 
Geographic and linguistic groups were also traditionally divided by area among 
polities based on hierarchy, kinship, allegiance, and obligation. Reflecting the impact 
of European colonial reorganization, of Indonesian repression, political culture, and 
institutions, and, finally, of independence, the people of Timor-Leste have come 
together as a more or less politically bonded group. However, the older language 
divisions, kinship groups, and allegiances remain. 
Also reflecting their origins, most of the people of Timor-Leste still live in rural 
and often quite remote areas. Despite being a relatively short physical distance from 
major centers, some rural communities are quite isolated from the still-limited levels 
of development found in the larger towns. Further reflecting the geography of the 
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country, communication with the capital, Dili, is often difficult and inconsistent, 
while the people and government of Dili have limited access to the countryside. 
Especially given the limited resources and capacity available in Dili, there is potential 
for-and considerable evidence of-an urban-rural or a center-periphery divide. 
Given that linguistic distinctions also remain, there is also capacity for linguistic and, 
to some extent, geographic divisions, which came to be identified with the political 
violence of 2006. As a result of these factors, the government of Timor-Leste was, as 
this was written, in the process of establishing decentralized forms of government. 
In light of the above circumstances, many political leaders have argued in favor 
of decentralizing the state's processes, to bring them closer to the people. There were 
also some strong arguments against decentralization, both in terms of practicality 
and vested interest. But despite these competing concerns and interests, at bottom 
was a commitment to this process that was articulated in the constitution of the state. 
Section 5.1 of the Constitution of Timor-Leste states that "the State shall respect the 
principle of decentralization of public administration."1 In many respects, this 
constitutional requirement reflected what was already known about the linguistic 
and geographic make-up of Timor-Leste prior to its drafting1 rather than try to 
impose a more common uniformity on its peoples; accepted their regional difference; 
and prefigured a potential contributing factor to the type of violence that 
characterized the events of 2006. Interestingly, the Ministry of State Administration, 
which was overseeing the decentralization process, had over its entrance the motto: 
"Adeus Conflitu, Benvindu Dezenvolvimentu" (Goodbye Conflict, Welcome 
Development), in recognition of the link between resolving conflict in order to allow 
development and development itself contributing to a lessening of conflict. 
This chapter will consider the rationale for and strengths and weaknesses of 
decentralizing a developing state, and some of the specific issues that pertain to 
Timor-Leste. It will explain the rationale for decentralization as one principally 
concerned with creating greater responsiveness between the state and its citizens by 
devolving a degree of political and economic authority from the capital to the district 
level, as well as recognizing the diversity of Timor-Leste's society. The process of 
decentralization in Timor-Leste began in 2003 and, as this was being written, was 
scheduled to be implemented, at least in its initial stages, by 2014.2 Section 5.2 of the 
constitution noted, however, that the laws intended to establish the characteristics of 
different territorial levels and administrative competencies were still to be 
determined. 
In a normative sense, given their proximity to and often local familiarity with 
citizens, locally elected officials can be reasonably expected to be more directly 
representative of and accountable to electors. In a state in which there are structural 
blockages to the absorption of economic capacity, devolving greater fiscal 
responsibility to the districts also implies a greater flow of capital from the center to 
the districts, which, in turn, leads to greater capital liquidity in the districts and, 
hence, more equitable economic opportunity. The devolution of at least some 
authority to the districts also reduces pressure on what is sometimes still a poorly 
1 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste 2002. See also Section 157h, 
www .constitution.org I cons I east_timor I constitution-eng.htm, accessed June 11, 2012. 
2 Susanne Kuehn, "Briefing Note on the Decentralization Process in Timar Leste," UNDP 
report, Dili, UNDP-UNCDF Local Governance Support Program, 2010. 
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understood or developing sense of state-based national identity, while reaffirming 
the legitimacy of a sense of the local in a still-evolving political framework. 
In most prior development models, centralization, which paralleled 
modernization theory in development processes, was initially thought to be the most 
rational use of state resources, especially where those resources were limited. 
According to those who proposed this model, the center would be able to distribute 
appropriately and evenly the goods and services available, while at the same time 
helping ensure loyalty to a state, often recently constructed around a still-developing 
political identity, as opposed to devolving the available stock of allegiances to local, 
separate, and potentially antistate entities. For developing states that had developed 
a Soviet-bloc model of state administration, centralized control also ensured full state 
authority over political matters, notably through the omniscience of the party of 
government's central committee. In Western-bloc-aligned states, centralization was 
seen as a rational bureaucratic allocation of limited resources in areas of state 
responsibility. However, as with the "modernization" paradigm implied in both 
these models, centralization was often bureaucratically inefficient and insensitive to 
or unaware of local needs; it privileged centralized and sometimes ethnically specific 
elites; and it bred corruption and unproductive political competition over control 
and allocation of limited resources. 
Following the failure of development of many centralized developing states (of 
both Western and Soviet camps), from the 1980s, there was turn toward 
decentralization, along with the diminution of high levels of government 
expenditure-often the main or only source of capital-and attendant moves toward 
the privatization of what were once government activities. There was also a parallel 
move on the part of many developing states to limit overall government expenditure, 
not least under International Monetary Fund "structural adjustment" programs. 
Under such programs, large central bureaucracies were often dramatically reduced, 
with responsibility for (often reduced) state services being allocated locally. These 
changes toward a more local model of state service delivery were increasingly 
promoted as a method for ensuring a more "authentic" path to development.3 It 
should be acknowledged that some proponents of decentralization had been arguing 
in favor of this model since the early 1960s.4 Like most ideas in development, the 
practice rarely matched the theory, and the experience of decentralization in the lives 
of people in developing countries was, therefore, mixed. 
In Indonesia, the state decentralized in 2001, in response to regional tensions 
following the collapse of the Indonesian economy in 1997 and the fall of the highly 
centralized New Order administration in 1998. Indonesia's restructuring of its 
government was, at the time, regarded as the most radical decentralization program 
to have been undertaken in the Asia Pacific region.5 No clear rationale was ever 
given for Indonesia's decentralization process, although it was widely understood to 
3 Philip Mawhood, "Decentralisation in the Third World in the 1980s," Planning and 
Administration 14,1 (1987): 10-22; Dennis Rondinelli, "Decentralisation in Comparative 
Perspective," International Review of Administrative Science 47,2 (1981): 133-45; Diane Conyers, 
"Decentralization: The Latest Fashion in Development Administration," Public Administration 
and Development 3,1 (1983): 97-109. 
4 For example, Henry Maddick, Democracy, Decentralisation, and Development (London: Asia 
Publishing House, 1963). 
5 Mark Turner and Owen Podger, Decentralisation in Indonesia: Redesigning the State (Canberra: 
Asia Pacific Press, Australian National University, 2003), p. xii. 
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be in response to an explosion of militant separatist claims, on one hand,6 and a 
considerable sense of disenchantment with Jakarta's excessively centralized 
economic and political failure, on the other.7 The Indonesian model of 
decentralization, then, gave renewed life to the idea of decentralization, not least as a 
means of quelling regional tensions. 
Despite its relative popularity in recent years, decentralization does, however, 
have potential and actual weaknesses. These weaknesses include greater 
opportunities for patronage and nepotism, typically lower levels of organizational 
capacity among local (as opposed to central) government offices, the potential to 
weaken central planning, and reduced efficiencies of scale. In the short term, 
decentralization can also fragment national identity by reinforcing local ethnic 
identity relative to a state-oriented "national" identity. In the longer term, however, 
decentralization can strengthen national identity by appealing to and strengthening 
common democratic process through greater opportunities for participation, more 
direct representation, and greater accountability. 
Through this shift toward greater representation and accountability, there is the 
potential for citizens to cohere around sets of values that reflect a reciprocal and 
equitable relationship between the citizenry and the state. From this development, a 
nation's citizens, initially understanding themselves as local and specific, further 
derive the potential to progress toward understanding themselves in common with 
others who share their civic values, which, in turn, creates stronger and more 
sustainable national bonds between citizens over diverse geographic and cultural 
spaces. 
STRENGTHS OF DECENTRALIZATION 
One of the biggest problems facing recently independent and other developing 
states, especially those with limited capacity,8 is their tendency toward the 
centralization of what are often limited government services and resources.9 This is a 
result of the need to concentrate the state capacity that is available close to the source 
of political authority so as to ensure the maximization of benefit from limited human 
and other resources. Timor-Leste was a good example of this centralization at work, 
6 In 2000 and 2001, when the decentralization policy was being planned and introduced, 
Timor-Leste had just separated from Indonesia; the separatist war in Aceh was at a peak of 
violence, and continuing at a lower level of violence in West Papua, Ambon, and other parts of 
Maluku; central and north Sulawesi were devoured by religious conflict, some of which 
religious violence had origins in separatist claims; there had been recent ethnic violence in 
Kalimantan; Riau was making noises about wanting separation; and even some Balinese were 
expressing discontent with what they saw as being shackled to a Java-dominated state, as 
represented by Jakarta. 
7 This observation is based on numerous discussions with Indonesians in Jakarta, as well as 
across much of the rest of the archipelago, in the period between 1997 and 2004. 
8 The limits upon or reduction of state capacity in post-colonial states is discussed in relation to 
sub-Saharan African states in Englebert Pierre, "Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, 
and Economic Development in Topical Africa," Political Research Quarterly 53,l (2000): 7-36; 
Richard Cornwall, "The End of the Post-Colonial State System in Africa?" African Security 
Review 8,2 (1999): 82-96; and David Hirschmann, "Early Post-Colonial Bureaucracy as History: 
The Case of the Lesotho Central Planning and Development Office, 1965-1975," International 
Journal of African Historical Studies 20,3 (1987): 455-70. 
9 Damien Kingsbury, East Timar: The Price of Liberty (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2009), p. 107. 
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especially under the newly independent state's first government, which through its 
central-committee-dominated political structure had a centralizing tendency in any 
case, 10 and which, under its prime minister, Marf Alkatiri, micromanaged much of 
government business. This micromanagement was intended to reduce waste within a 
limited budget and reduce the corruption that had been endemic under the 
Indonesian administration and that tended to decrease in the culture of the post-
Indonesia administration. 11 
Despite the underlying good sense of the close control/ micromanagement policy 
pursued by Alkatiri, it had two negative impacts. The first negative impact was that 
the degree of micromanagement meant that processing the numerous requests for 
expenditure created a financial bottleneck. This meant that desperately needed funds 
were often not made available in a timely manner for a range of projects, particularly 
those in the districts outside the capital of Dili, nor were basic government services 
always available.12 The second negative impact was that Dili received a 
disproportionately higher degree of government revenue than the districts, creating 
increased competition for access to those resources within Dili and greater 
competition for political patronage beyond Dili. This then set up a situation in which 
underemployed people in the districts would come to Dili seeking work and 
services, creating an unsustainable growth in Dili's population and a large pool of 
unemployed persons, especially youths, in this urban area. According to former 
World Bank-appointed advisor to Timor-Leste's first government: 
Ramos-Horta [said] a 50 percent increase in housing investment last year 
marks a significant act of faith by the community in the country's future, 
despite its lack of secure land title. But these comments reflect the Dili 
economy, ignoring the one million or more people who live in rural areas, 
largely dependent on tilling small plots of land. The lack of public-sector 
investment outside Dili is blindingly obvious, forecasting a serious 
development trap. A booming Dili economy will draw more people from the 
districts, leading to more youth unemployment, more gangs and more 
crime.13 
The disproportionate allocation of resources in Dili also meant that the restricted 
resources available in the districts outside Dili increased the numbers of needy 
potential clients and relatively more powerful patrons who controlled scarce 
government resources. This outcome both militated against democratic outcomes 
that were said to be desired by the government and which were enshrined in the 
constitution and facilitated corruption and nepotism on the part of local officials. 
10 Helen M. Hill, Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor-FRETILIN 1974-1978: The Origins, 
Ideologies, and Strategies of a Nationalist Movement (Sydney: Otford Press, 2002), p. 3, regarding 
its earlier phase. 
11 Kingsbury, Price of Liberty, p. 108. 
12 Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management, MSATM Develops Joint 
National Programme to Support the Decentralization Process, Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 
Dili, 2010. 
13 Paul Cleery, "Timor's Poor in Peril amid Plenty," Australian, June 26, 2010, p. 12. 
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The move towards decentralization, then, was intended to reduce or resolve 
funding bottlenecks, to provide a wider and more equitable allocation of access to 
government services in rural areas, 14 to increase the state's overall absorptive 
capacity, and to increase financial liquidity in areas that had little cash flow. 
Decentralization was also intended to soften the process of nation formation, in 
which alien concepts could be introduced too quickly or jarringly and thus lead to 
misunderstanding and sometimes rejection. The decentralization program was, 
importantly, also intended to recognize that while there is a sense of common 
identity in Timor-Leste, based primarily around a common struggle for 
independence, there was also a sense of specific difference between various language 
and geographic groups. The issue of absorptive capacity was particularly troubling, 
in that the state was often unable to spend the full allocation of the still relatively 
limited funds that it had available. That is, despite there being relatively little money 
to spend, ministries responsible for the spending of funds in order to implement 
state policy were not even able to allocate and spend the amount that was available. 
This meant that the limited economic stimulus that might have been available, 
especially for the majority of the population living outside Dili, was missing due to 
an inability of the state to "absorb" the finances that were available. 
One of the key aims of decentralization was to promote transparency 15 through a 
more directly and locally accountable political process. However, there were some 
concerns that handing the allocation of funding projects to the district level would 
increase localized nepotism, corruption, and waste. There was already a tendency for 
officials to allocate spending on local projects to family members, sometimes through 
the districts in which the work, such as road building or maintenance, was to be 
undertaken. Given the relatively small size of local communities and the limited 
opportunities for advancement and, particularly, the small number and often 
interconnectedness of business and political elites, nepotism was not always overtly 
intentional, even if there was an awareness of the closeness of the contracting 
process. Similarly, notions of conflict of interest were not so much poorly understood 
as simply not understood at all. Corruption in its more formal sense was better 
understood, even it in many respects, as an acculturated business practice. Many 
local citizens attributed corruption among local officials to the negative influences of 
the Indonesian occupation, during which corruption was indeed rife (and still is in 
much of Indonesia). However, this assumed that corruption did not exist in Timor 
prior to the Indonesian interregnum, an assumption challenged by the scanty 
evidence from before 1975, which tends to indicate that both Portuguese officials, as 
well as lower level indigenous employees, all engaged in varieties of corruption, 
contract rigging, favoritism in official employment, and skimming from the very few 
services that were provided by the Portuguese colonial administration. This is not, of 
course1 to mention the numerous ways in which patron-client relations allow for 
nepotism, profit taking, and extortion in ways that did not even have the most 
distant relationship to notions of good governance. In that there was potential for 
waste, this possibility then raised the sometimes troubled issue of value judgments 
concerning the best use of money or the standards of goods or services acquired; 
14 Ministry of State Administration, Decentralisation and Local Government in Timor-Leste: Policy 
Orientation Guideline for Decentralisation and Local Government in Timor-Leste, Government of 
Timor-Leste, March 2008, Section 1.2. 
15 Ibid., p. 2. 
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what was "waste" to people with certain perspectives was 11value" for money or 
appropriate disbursement to others. In short, the often poor standard of goods or 
services provided, the poor quality of workmanship, the (failure of) completion 
schedules, and very often the general disinterest in paid work (as opposed to support 
payments that require no work) were issues that could be found in developing 
countries all over the world. However, they were very evident in Timor-Leste, where 
common practices ranged from 11fixing" something so that it always existed on the 
edge of again breaking down, to seeking a job in an office, particularly a government 
office, principally for its status and the opportunity to use computers to play 
games. 16 All too commonly, jobs were half done or done so poorly they were either 
abandoned or needed to be done again or recognized as having been unnecessary 
and badly planned in the first place. 
In some senses, such concerns about the mismanagement of funds-important 
though this mismanagement undoubtedly remained-was less important than the 
fact that funds were being allocated into areas where the resident officials and 
citizens would, one way or the other, spend them on local goods and services. This 
was then intended to help produce fiscal liquidity and stimulate local economic 
activity in areas that had previously been economically stagnant and in which cash 
was a rare commodity, thus cutting off local people from all but bartered goods. In 
that funding would be allocated on a needs basis, it was hoped that the closer 
relationships between the funding body and the recipients and (externally applied) 
appropriate accountability mechanisms would help ensure the more nuanced and 
detailed allocation of funding to where it was most needed. 
Finally, the state comprises peoples of diverse ethnic identities who in 2006 
appeared to divide along broad geographic lines and also along language group 
lines. While there was a high degree of political manipulation in the conflict of 2006, 
based on political divisions that arose during the resistance, they did highlight the 
need for a devolution of politics and the economic decision-making authority 
intended to accompany national politics that might alleviate some of the strain from 
a still nascent sense of national identity. This reaffirmation of the local, as opposed 
the putatively 11national," was expressed more positively as "the maintenance of 
ethno-linguistic homogeneity and local cultural identity."17 
WEAKNESSES OF DECENTRALIZATION 
The process of decentralization is not especially new as a means to allocate 
resources more effectively, to devolve administrative responsibility away from a 
sometimes remote center, and to place greater and more direct political control in the 
hands of local people. However, the experiences of decentralization have not always 
been successful, for a range of reasons. As Paul Smoke, Eduardo Gomez, and George 
Peterson have noted: 
16 The author had the experience, in Dili in 2008, of asking a young university graduate what 
he wanted to do. "Get a job with the government," was the answer. "Why?" the author asked. 
"So," came the reply, "I can have a computer and play games." To be fair, however, there are 
many conscientious government employees who work long and hard hours with few 
resources and limited reward. 
17 Ministry of State Administration, Decentralisation and Local Government in Timor-Leste, p. 3. 
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During the 1990s it became clear that the normative expectations of 
decentralization had often exceeded its actual performance. Subnational 
deficits, debt, corruption, and inefficient resource allocation emerged in 
many countries, in a few cases threatening national fiscal stability ... In effect, 
normatively justified decentralization had met political and institutional 
reality. 18 
In this, Smoke, Gomez, and Peterson were primarily concerned with economic 
managerial capacity. Mark Turner and Owen Podger expressed similar concerns: 
In theory, decentralized systems of government are better able to address 
poverty because of their familiarity with the local situation, the greater 
accessibility of the poor to decision makers1 and the more rapid response 
rates of local government. These assumptions begin to unravel if 
bureaucratic forms of organisation remain characteristic of regional 
government, if local elites monopolise the benefits of devolution, and if 
popular accountability is poorly articulated or implemented.19 
However, at least as great a concern, and possibly a greater one, has been that by 
taking away financial accountability from a coherent center that is able to be 
scrutinized, decentralization can provide greater opportunities for patronage and 
nepotism. As noted by Turner and Podger, "Local democracy might tend to favor 
local elites, and the emergence of 'money politics."'20 In particular, the experience of 
decentralization in Indonesia often meant that a state that had experienced a high 
level of centralized corruption had, through the process of decentralization, in effect, 
decentralized the already high levels of corruption and arguably increased overall 
levels of corruption.21 
While Timor-Leste is now independent1 the administrative processes that most 
East Timorese have experienced and learned to use are those introduced by 
Indonesian bureaucrats during the period of the occupation. This administrative 
style has left a deep imprint on notions of how to administer both local and national 
government, along with notions of the privileges that can be claimed by those who 
wield administrative and bureaucratic authority. Parallel to this, as is true in 
Indonesia, has been the dilemma that faces government employees who receive low 
levels of income relative to their high costs of living and who, at the same time, enjoy 
greater access to sources of official funds. Recognition of corruption in Timor-Leste22 
has led to the establishment of an anti-corruption commission and a state-wide anti-
corruption campaign. The question is whether this relatively new and, at the time of 
18 P. Smoke, E. Gomez, and G. Peterson, "Understanding Decentralization: The Need for a 
Broader Approach," in Decentralization in Asia and Latin America, ed. P. Smoke, E. Gomez, and 
G. Peterson (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), p. 3. See also R. Sukma, "Conflict Management 
in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia," in Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia, ed. D. Kingsbury 
and H. Aveling (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 71. 
19 Turner and Podger, Decentralisation in Indonesia, p. 141-42. 
20 Ibid., p. xiv. 
21 T. Rinaldi, M. Purnomo, and D. Damayanti, Fighting Corruption in Decentralized Indonesia 
(Jakarta: World Bank, 2007). 
22 USAID, Corruption Assessment: Timor-Leste (Washington, DC United States Agency for 
International Development, 2009), pp. 2-11. 
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writing, untested anti-corruption commission would be effective against significant 
vested interests and have the scope and capacity to reach beyond Dili and into the 
districts. 
One of the further issues experienced when Indonesia underwent 
decentralization was that, in many cases, there was a dearth of administrative 
capacity at the local level. As Dennis Rondinelli noted, the lure of the metropolis, 
including national ministries, state corporations, and other agencies, also tended to 
attract away the most talented and best-educated officials from the regions, leaving a 
chronic shortage of talent at the local level.23 Ismet Fanany also noted this 
phenomenon in Indonesia, whereby "the highly centralized system of administration 
in Indonesia has tended to draw capable administrators to the centre as they moved 
up through the administrative hierarchy, leaving what is perceived as a talent 
vacuum at the regional level."24 According to Shabbir Cheema and Rondinelli, 
"Decentralization can only be effective when agencies and actors at the regional and 
local levels have developed the capacities to perform effectively the planning, 
decision-making and management functions that are formally granted to them." 25 
Such studies demonstrate that the effectiveness of decentralization depends on the 
capacity of local institutions to identify problems, solutions, and opportunities to 
define and resolve development issues, decision making and conflict resolution, 
organization of resources, and management skills. 
Although the government of Timor-Leste has significantly developed since the 
tabula rasa of 1999, there is still little administrative capacity within the state, and 
what capacity exists is often very shallowly rooted and-descending beyond the 
senior layers of bureaucratic management-quickly reveals low levels of 
understanding and performance in government administration. This is especially the 
situation at the district level. 
DELAYED DECENTRALIZATION 
While a lack of local capacity and localized corruption have been shown to be 
critical problems with at least some cases of decentralization, poor initial planning 
has also hampered the ability of a number of states to put in place an adequate, 
proper, functioning decentralized political system. The process in Timor-Leste was 
intended to be rolled out in two stages so as to test the process initially with just four 
districts-Dili, Bobonaro, Oecussi, and Baucau-before bringing the remaining nine 
districts into the program. However, even this plan was a modification of the 
original plan, according to which four districts were to be decentralized, followed by 
five, and then another four. 26 The plan to revert from a four-five-four rollout model 
to a four-nine model followed the extended delay in the process of drafting and 
approving the three pieces of requisite legislation, with the planned drafting and 
legislative process running over a year behind schedule and the initial date of 
23 Dennis Rondinelli, "Decentralization of Development Administration in East Africa," in 
Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries, ed. G. Shabbiir 
Cheema and D. Rondinelli (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983), pp. 77-126. 
24 Ismet Fanany, "The First Year of Local Autonomy: The Case of West Sumatra," in Autonomy 
and Disintegration in Indonesia, p. 178. 
25 Cheema and Rondinelli, Decentralization and Development, p. 299. 
26 This is based on discussions with senior state administration officials in September 2008. 
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implementation pushed back from 2009 to 2014.27 The three pieces of requisite 
legislation included legislation on defining the districts that would be granted 
greater political power (Law on Administrative and Territorial Division, approved 
June 2009), the composition of the new local legislatures (Local Government Lawt 
and the competencies of the new local legislatures (Municipal Elections Law).28 
Having passed through the council of ministers1 the legislation in question was 
initially expected to be passed quickly, but is almost immediately ran into problems. 
Despite the fact that the government held a majority in parliament1 it was clear from 
the outset that sifting through the eighty-four pages of Portuguese legal text that 
comprises the legislation would take time and require Timor-Leste's representatives 
to do more than simply rubber-stamp the document. There were problems from the 
outset, not least a statement in the draft legislation determining that the new district 
mayors would be both directly elected and elected by their councils and that a 
directly elected mayor could be removed by a vote of the council. Such glaring 
problems required a detailed reappraisal of the proposal. Beyond these problems 
there was some concern that the existing subdistrict administration, which appeared 
to serve communities relatively well, would disappear, to be replaced by municipal 
branch offices. 
Delays in the drafting and legislative schedule, caused by efforts to address 
internal inconsistencies and weaknesses in the draft legislation, meant that the 
decentralization process was traveling well behind its original schedule. In 
particular, while there was little debate about the boundaries for the electoral 
districts given that they were based on existing districts, there was considerable 
debate about what powers should be devolved to district legislatures. In part1 this 
reflected concern with local competencies, and in part, it reflected concern by some 
ministers over the devolution and, hence, loss of their own ministerial authority. 
The draft laws call for a strong central government with nominal powers for 
local government and give the central government control over everything 
the local government does, including the legislative assembly. And the 
central government proposes to retain the power to review all the legislative 
assembly's decisions. 29 
Finally, delays were caused by inadequacies in the national parliamentary system, in 
which the relevant parliamentary committee was unable to finalize its approval of 
the legislation to go to parliament. The deadlock in this committee was due, in part, 
to the constructed pedantry of some of the elected representatives who continued to 
disapprove of the formation of the government, which had carriage of the legislation. 
The deadlock also reflected a genuine weaknesses in the legislation as it was initially 
27 J. Coa, "Municipal Elections Postponed Until 2014," Dili Weekly 91, Year III, June 2010, p. 1. 
28 S. Kuehn, Briefing Note on the Decentralization Process in Timor Leste, UNDP-UNCDF 
Local Governance Support Program report, Dili, 2010, www.estatal.gov. 
tl/Documents/DNDLOT /LGSP /BriefingNoteDecen2011.pdf, accessed May 20, 2012. 
29 Silas Everett and Juan Mayo Ragragio, "Decentralisation in Timor-Leste: What's at Stake?" 
East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin, June 26, 2009, http://asiafoundation.org/in-
asia I 2009 / 06 I 24 I decentralization-in-timor-leste-whats-at-stake I, accessed May 1, 2012. 
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proposed.30 Delays were also caused by the committee often being unable to 
assemble a quorum. This was the result of two principal factors: (a) there were no 
party or parliamentary whips to ensure that members attended committee meetings 
and parliamentary sessions, and members of smaller parties sometimes had to attend 
different committee meetings at the same time, and (b) to help ensure that 
parliamentarians did not ignore areas outside Dili, there were financial incentives to 
spend time in the districts that exceeded financial incentives to remain in Dili.31 
By way of comparison, in Indonesia the decentralization process was quickly 
conceived and implemented. The Indonesian decentralization process also showed 
that, despite a systematic and participatory regulatory process, the process of 
establishing regulation for decentralization was "disorderly," according to Turner 
and Podger, who further note that "Top level political support was lacking, central 
agencies were sometimes uncooperative, and regional stakeholders were rarely 
consulted." 32 While the Timor-Leste experience of decentralization was, in a number 
of senses, different from that of Indonesia, including the extent of the powers 
available to the local assembly, and the differences in scale, as Timor-Leste's 
government was so much smaller than Indonesia's, there were also clear parallels 
between the two. The main parallel was that both states regarded decentralization as 
a mechanism that would enable the state to better serve local communities, on one 
hand, while, on the other, reducing pressure arising from local groups that had 
political and cultural identities that were distinct from those of the political center. 
Indonesia came to this position more than five decades after independence; Timor-
Leste had this requirement written into its constitution from the outset. Timor-Leste 
enjoyed another advantage over Indonesia with respect to decentralization; the 
extended delays that postponed the implementation of Timor-Leste's program meant 
that, although there was a degree of inadequate consultation with district-level 
stakeholders, lawmakers had more time to insure that requisite regulations would be 
in place before the program commenced. 
In light of the slowness of implementation of decentralization, and following a 
national tour of Timor-Leste's districts, in May 2010, the prime minister, Xanana 
Gusmao, authorized direct payments of up to US$50,000 to each of the 442 suco-level 
(village-level) administrations.33 This had the effect of injecting funds directly into 
local communities while the decentralization program issue was being resolved and 
of lessening the districts' reliance on central administration to disburse funds 
regionally. This move toward allocating funds directly to the suco level was resisted 
to some extent by ministers who saw a diminution of the funds thus available to 
them for disbursement. However, the total fund allocated was not great and did not 
have a meaningful impact upon ministers' departmental budgets. Rather, there was a 
feeling that this experience was a foretaste of the subsequent diminution of the 
ministers' political power, which they did not like. From the perspective of the prime 
30 According to a senior FRETILIN parliamentary source who said the original drafts 
contained numerous weaknesses that needed to be resolved (personal communication, July 
2010, Dili). 
31 Based on discussions with Government of Timor-Leste advisors during 2009. 
32 Turner and Podger, Decentralisation in Indonesia, p. xiii. 
33 
"Xanana Resist against Indonesia Used Strategic Guerilla Warfare and to Develop the 
Country with PEDN," Tempo Semanal, May 31, 2010, http:/ /temposemanaltimor.blogspot.com 
/2010 /05 /xanana-resist-against-indonesia-used.html, accessed May 1, 2012. 
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minister, however, his tour of the districts, combined with the allocation of funds, 
helped shore up his personal popularity and, hence, that of his political party, the 
Council for Timorese National Reconstruction (Congresso Nacional Reconstrucr;;ao 
de Timor, CNRT), ahead of the 2012 elections. Indeed, such was the boost given to 
the prime minister's political standing by this gesture that it was widely thought that 
he could capitalize on it and call an early election. Such was the power of appealing 
directly to voters, and offering them even modest funding, where they lived. 
One of the potential problems with decentralization, however, that was, to some 
extent, experienced also in Indonesia, was that the process had the potential to 
weaken national planning. Effective national planning can be disrupted if different 
districts embark on distinct and uncoordinated development programs, in particular 
regarding infrastructure and cross-boundary resource programs. This potential 
dilemma, in part, explained the limitations that lawmakers and analysts expected 
would be imposed upon districts, both in their initial start-up periods of 
decentralization as well as later in the process, when they would still be held 
accountable to the central government. In Indonesia, following decentralization, local 
economic disputes became commonplace and potentially destabilizing, in particular, 
in relation to access to local resources.34 There was one case, in particular, in West 
Sumatra, in which one district administration halted the flow of a river that, 
downstream, supplied the water needs of another administration. This dispute did 
not last long but was indicative of the lack of planning that could go into such 
decision making, or the improper purposes to which these various, regional 
development plans could be put. The disputes that did arise concerning transport 
and water-basin management in Indonesia were finally resolved through 
interregional cooperation; it was in the interests of all parties to cooperate to achieve 
shared outcomes otherwise not individually available. Even where there was 
interregional cooperation, in Timor-Leste there remained potential for the central 
government to have to negotiate with each of the thirteen districts in order to achieve 
consensus on which development projects should be initiated across the state, and 
the coordination for that process.35 
One of the advantages of centralization of resources is that a central government 
can achieve greater efficiencies of scale in planning, time, and expenditure by saving 
on replication and being able to purchase goods and services in larger quantities, 
hence, more cheaply. By way of contrast, smaller planning units would not be able to 
achieve such efficiencies, would tend to replicate a range of services that need 
implementation only once to be effective, and would buy goods and services in 
relatively small quantities, at less competitive prices. Fiscal management can also be 
weakened by economic decentralization in cases where regions have responsibility 
for raising, allocating, or forwarding taxes. 36 However, those who have shaped and 
implemented Timor-Leste's decentralization process do not envisage fiscal 
decentralization but, rather, expect that the central government will manage the 
economy and allocate resources to the districts on a per capita basis. 
34 Turner and Podger, Decentralisation in Indonesia, p. 142. 
35 See, for example, Sukma, "Conflict Management in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia," p. 70, on 
the Indonesian experience. 
36 V. Gandhi, "Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Economic Performance," in 
Macroeconomic Management and Fiscal Decentralization, ed. J. Roy (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 1995). 
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Finally, in the short term, and noting that decentralization is at least in part 
intended to preserve and enhance local cultural identity, decentralization can have 
the potential to fragment national identity by reinforcing rather than resolving 
distinct and sometimes competing ethnicities. In a country in which a sense of state-
based national identity had not yet been fully formed, that is weak or under 
challenge, strengthening the citizenry's local as opposed to the national allegiances 
may reinforce regional differences rather than commonalities. Given the regionally 
distinct character of political allegiances in Timor-Leste, this stood as a real problem, 
if in the planning stage it was still only a potential problem. In all, then, where 
decentralization has been attempted in developing countries, "in most cases, central 
governments initiated, introduced, and heavily publicized decentralization policies 
only to see them falter during implementation."37 That is to say, decentralization has 
a number of theoretical advantages to offer a highly centralized state with limited 
capacity and resources, but it also presents a number of new challenges, many of 
which have not been adequately addressed in a number of decentralization projects 
that have been implemented elsewhere. 
DOES DECENTRALIZATION STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACY? 
There are two key normative features of decentralization, which are inter-
related. The first normative feature of decentralization is the allocation of resources 
closer to the source of receipt to help ensure the more precise delivery of those 
resources to the citizens. The second normative feature of decentralization is that it 
brings accountability for such allocation closer to the people for whom it is intended. 
As Peter Aucoin and Ralph Heintzman noted, "Accountability is the cornerstone of 
public governance and management because it constitutes the principle that informs 
the processes whereby those who hold and exercise public authority are held to 
account." 38 Decentralization is intended to achieve its intended outcomes by 
strengthening the relationship between citizens and public authority, through the 
state's local manifestations. 
The key element of Timor-Leste' s decentralization process is the establishment of 
local municipal councils that were intended to have responsibility for overseeing 
local planning and the allocation of resources.39 For many people in Timor-Leste, 
despite improvements in transport and communications, the center of the state in 
Dili remained physically and conceptually remote from their daily lives. Indicative 
surveys had shown that, short of the forced migration that characterized the 
Indonesian period, most Timorese never traveled more than forty kilometers from 
their place of birth. The localness of life-while not necessarily a factor in the success 
or failure of decentralization-was compounded by the often very poor 
infrastructure that made extensive travel difficult, if not impossible, and the 
prohibitive costs associated with travel. Further, Timor-Leste's use of a proportional 
37 Cheema and Rondinelli, Decentralization and Development, p. 297. 
38 Peter Aucoin and Ralph Heintznman, "The Dialectics of Accountability in an Era of 
Reform," International Review of Administrative Sciences 66,1 (2000): 45. 
39 The extent of the allocation of resources was, at the time of writing, not finalized, but 
appeared to have been reduced from extensive allocations to, at least initially, the allocations 
of health care, as per Section 57 of the Constitution, and water. 
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representation electoral system, 40 intended to ensure the greatest representation of 
disparate political views, meant that local citizens did not have locally elected 
representatives; politicians did travel to the districts, but there was a sense that, for 
most Timorese, these representatives were remote and not directly accountable or 
responsive. The establishment of local councils was, then, intended to establish a 
system of representation closer to where people actually lived and empower 
representatives who would be potentially better able to include local people in the 
political process, in terms of consulting and commenting on, and contributing to 
policy development. This then would help ensure accountability, as well as 
participation in the political process, for local citizens could potentially run for a seat 
on the municipal council. 
The councils themselves were intended, potentially, to be better able to 
understand and reflect the concerns of local citizens in their policy prescriptions, and 
be directly accountable for the successes and failures of implementing such policies. 
As noted by Leena Avonius, in relation to Indonesia's process of decentralization, 
"The laws on regional autonomy were seen as an opportunity for establishing a new 
kind of local government which would be more democratic and transparent."41 It 
may well be that there were a number of organizational difficulties in the 
implementation of decentralization in Indonesia, and there is little doubt that this 
particular process decentralized and thus dispersed previously highly centralized 
corruption along with political and economic capacities. But decentralization did 
give ordinary Indonesians greater and more direct access to government services and 
was a key component in helping to lessen regional tensions at a time when 
opposition to the political center, exemplified by the Jakarta bureaucracy, was at its 
highest point since the late 1950s. In terms of corruption, by way of comparison, in 
Timor-Leste some ministers who had already received kick-backs from promised 
contracts not yet awarded were frustrated by the reduction of their budgets for the 
2010 suco funding program. However, even the suco-level direct funding was 
hamstrung by a number of Dili-based companies setting up district-level offices and 
applying for local contracts, with much of the money from the contracts that were 
won simply returning to Dili. This, then, explained at least some of the reluctance of 
Timor-Leste's central government representatives to embrace fully the 
decentralization program, even though decentralization in Timor-Leste took place in 
political terms and much less so in economic terms. 
More positively, while decentralization is explicitly intended to enhance local 
cultural identity, general agreement that local identities can and should be supported 
in effect constitutes agreement on the principle of pluralism, or the acceptance of 
difference within a varied community. Further, while local communities might 
refocus their immediate attentions on local matters if encouraged to do so by 
decentralization, increased engagement with and participation in political processes, 
including direct representation and greater accountability, enhances the process of 
embedding democratic principles across the state. Accountability, in particular, 
further implies notions of social fairness, justice, and rule of law. Each of these 
40 The proportional representation electoral system is where candidates are elected from party 
lists across the state rather than on a seat-by-seat, direct representational basis. 
41 L. Avonius, "Indonesian Adat Communities: Promise and Challenges of Democracy and 
Globalisation," in The Politics of the Periphery in Indonesia, ed. M. Sakai, G. Banks, and J. Walker 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), p. 232. 
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qualities is a key marker of civic political development, and general subscription to 
such values implies, not a replacement of local identity, but the addition of a 
consensus around civic values. 
CONCLUSION 
If we accept that the term "nation" refers to a state that has been founded upon, 
among other things, a common cultural or ethnic identity,42 Timor-Leste faced 
serious challenges to national cohesion, as a consequence of the ethnic distinctions 
that characterized its peoples. These differences were widely claimed to have 
contributed to the breakdown of political order that wracked the state in 2006 and 
led to a situation perilously close to civil war. However, the citizenry's growing 
commitment to such civic values provided an alternative site of national unity that 
did not rely on primordial loyalties but to a growing sense of engagement in and 
identification with the state. This, then, was the glue that would, it was hoped, bond 
the nation as it continued to develop. 
The benefits of decentralization in Timor-Leste, as elsewhere1 were not at any 
point a given1 and the process has continued to face significant challenges. The 
critical criterion in determining its success or otherwise appeared to be the extent of 
care in the design and application of the process. To that end1 the plan to introduce 
decentralization first to four districts and later to others seemed sensible, as did the 
scrutiny being given to the legislative process (even if other factors also had an 
impact upon its progress). As noted by Smoke, Gomez, and Peterson: 
"Decentralization could be beneficial under appropriate political and institutional 
circumstances and if properly designed and applied." 43 
The success of decentralization also depended on whether it was linked to a 
genuine process of increased or enhanced democratization, in which citizens found a 
new and substantive outlet for their political voice. If this was not the case, as Rizal 
Sukma noted, 11There has been a general consensus that regional autonomy would 
not work if it [were] not carried out within the context of democratisation." 44 The 
experiment of decentralization in Timor-Leste had gotten underway slowly; it was 
hoped that it would be a positive process, but it faced a number of challenges. As 
such, the outcome of this political experiment would not be known for some time to 
come. 
42 A. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986), pp. 13-18; and E. 
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 44. 
43 Smoke et al., "Understanding Decentralization," p. 4. 
44 Sukma, "Conflict Management in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia," p. 72. 
